

## Business Resiliency After Action Report

Event Name	2022.10.22 SCE PSPS Event	Activation Dates	10.22.22 – 10.24.22
Type / Category	PSPS Activation - Forecasted Elevated Fire Weather Conditions		

### **Activation Summary, Scenario:**

This high-threat event began when SCE remotely activated its Emergency Operations Center on October 19<sup>th</sup> at 12:00 pm in response to a weather system that was forecasted to move across the SCE service territory from October 22<sup>nd</sup> through October 24<sup>th</sup>, 2022, impacting Inyo, Mono and Tuolumne Counties in the first phase of the event, and portions of Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino, and Ventura Counties in the second phase of the event. On October 19<sup>th</sup>, SCE's meteorologists initially identified the potential for fire weather conditions in localized portions of Inyo, Mono and Tuolumne Counties in the Eastern Sierra due to gusty downslope winds, low relative humidity, and dry fuels, with the potential for additional impacts later in the week in the Southern California mountains and valleys as the weather system moved through the SCE service territory. On October 22<sup>nd</sup>, SCE's meteorologists confirmed these additional fire weather conditions for Sunday October 23<sup>rd</sup> in portions of Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino, and Ventura Counties due to gusty Santa Ana winds and dry conditions from the same weather system as it moved through the southern portion of the SCE service territory. During this event, SCE's meteorology and fire science experts maintained close communication with the Geographic Area Coordination Center (GACC)<sup>1</sup> to evaluate the potential fire weather impacts to multiple circuits. During this communication, the GACC indicated agreement with SCE's forecast of elevated fire weather for the two phases of this high threat event.

In response to this forecasted fire weather, SCE activated its PSPS dedicated Incident Management Team (IMT) on October 19<sup>th</sup> at 12:00 pm to manage this event. Ultimately, fire weather conditions did not materialize during either phase of this high threat event and SCE meteorologists ended the PSPS event earlier than anticipated at 3:00 pm on October 24<sup>th</sup> based on actual observed weather conditions. As such, no circuits or customers were ultimately de-energized.

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<sup>1</sup> The GACC is the physical location of an interagency, regional operation center for the effective coordination, mobilization, and demobilization of federal state and local wildland fire agencies through logistical coordination of resources throughout the geographic area, as well as with other geographic areas.

**Strengths:**

1. There were no ignitions, safety concerns, or injuries resulting from this PSPS event
2. There was solid collaboration, coordination and communication between all PSPS IMT positions.
3. This was the very first event where the Customer Service Branch assumed responsibility for local government notifications and the transition went well.

**Areas for improvement:**

1. Core event metrics were inconsistent between individual CDP uses cases and core applications (e.g. CDP, sce.com and the public safety partner portal. Additionally, some notification actions required manual intervention and were therefore delayed.
2. Lack of detailed generator connection procedures resulted in delays in installing generators to support two Community Resiliency Zones (CRZs).
3. Manual intervention was necessary to produce in-event risk calculator results for sub-transmission circuits.

Corrective Actions Table						
#	Priority	Description	Recommended Solution	Category	Owner	Date
1	High	Core event metrics were inconsistent between individual CDP uses cases and core applications (e.g. CDP, sce.com and the public safety partner portal, which delayed updates of external briefing materials and inquiries from state agency staff. Additionally, some notification actions required manual intervention and were therefore delayed.	See attachment 'A' for a detailed description of each issue and the corresponding corrective action and timeline for addressing each identified gap. <b>Attachment A:</b> <a href="#">2022 CDP Tracker</a>	CDP	"employee name removed"	Q1
2	High	SCE deployed mobile generators to predetermined Resiliency Zones in two communities during this event.  Lack of detailed generator connection procedures resulted in delays in installing generators to support two Community Resiliency Zones (CRZs).	Develop generator connection procedures with equipment specifications for applicable CRZ/CRC locations. Ensure appropriate environmental permitting is in place for each location.  Provide connection procedure and generator permit (if applicable) to TSD and responsible District Manager.	Customer Outreach and Engagement	"employee name removed"	Q1

3	High	Manual intervention was necessary to produce in-event risk calculator results for sub-transmission circuits, which resulted in delays in populating in-event risk calculation output.	Modify in-event risk calculator to account for sub-transmission circuit impacts and make necessary updates to the Post Event Report narrative to reflect these enhancements.	Event Mgmt	"employee name removed"	Q1
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